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European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation

  • Barry Eichengreen

    (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Fabio Ghironi

    (University of California, Berkeley)

In this paper we describe some of the opportunities and perils for international monetary cooperation associated with EMU. Our approach brings together two strands in the literature; one concerned with institutions, the other focusing on policy consensus. Our analysis raises questions about the scope for monetary cooperation in Europe and across the Atlantic. While institutional and intellectual support for monetary-policy coordination within Europe will be further strengthened in Stage III of the transition to EMU, a limitation of that framework concerns relations between the "ins" and the "outs" -- between member states that will and that will not be founding members of the monetary union. While this problem can be remedied, it presently looms as the principal threat to monetary cohesion in Europe and to the broader program of economic and political integration with which the EMU project is linked. By comparison, institutional and intellectual support for transatlantic monetary cooperation, and for G-7 monetary cooperation more generally, remains deficient. The advent of Stage III will only highlight these limitations.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series International Trade with number 9804001.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 03 Apr 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:9804001
Note: 48 pages, Text created in WordPerfect/Windows, converted to WORD 6.0
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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  1. Haas, Peter M., 1992. "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(01), pages 1-35, December.
  2. Barry Eichengreen., 1993. "International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-021, University of California at Berkeley.
  3. Kenen,Peter B., 1995. "Economic and Monetary Union in Europe," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521558839.
  4. Frankel, Jeffrey, 1987. "Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2vv7z9cr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  5. Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons., 1988. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Economics Working Papers 8863, University of California at Berkeley.
  6. George Alogoskoufis & Richard Portes, 1990. "International Costs and Benefits from EMU," NBER Working Papers 3384, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Barry Eichengreen and Jurgen von Hagen., 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C95-056, University of California at Berkeley.
  8. Buiter, W.H. & Corsetti, G.M. & Pesenti, P.A., 1998. "Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues," Princeton Studies in International Economics 84, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  9. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 1994. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9595, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. Goldstein, Judith, 1988. "Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(01), pages 179-217, December.
  11. Peter B.. Kenen, 1990. "The Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies," NBER Chapters, in: International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations, pages 63-108 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. C. Randall Henning, 1994. "Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 15.
  13. Eichengreen, Barry & Ghironi, Fabio, 1995. "European Monetary Unification: The Challenges Ahead," CEPR Discussion Papers 1217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. C. Fred Bergsten & C. Randall Henning, 1996. "Global Economic Leadership and the Group of Seven," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 45.
  15. Holtham, Gerald & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1987. "International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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