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European Policy Coordination: An Evaluation

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  • Oudiz, Gilles

Abstract

Uncoordinated macroeconomic policies lead to 'beggar thy neighbour' strategies which are clearly suboptimal for the European Community as a whole. Given the high degree of interdependence of their economies, European governments have a clear incentive to export their inflation or their unemployment. No formal model is needed to conclude that among countries which have similar economic structures, policy objectives and policy instruments such competition is bound to be futile and costly for all concerned. In this paper we try to shed light on these aspects of European policy coordination, both through the use of a simple analytic model and through an empirical evaluation of the potential gains of superior European strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Oudiz, Gilles, 1985. "European Policy Coordination: An Evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 81, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:81
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Susan M. Collins, 1988. "Inflation and the E M S," NBER Working Papers 2599, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Frankel, Jeffrey A., 1988. "Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3-4), pages 353-374, July.
    3. Laskar Daniel, 1986. "Balance of payments constraint in a non cooperative world (the)," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8606, CEPREMAP.
    4. Giorgio Basevi & Paolo Kind & Giorgio Poli, 1988. "Economic Cooperation and Confrontation between Europe and the U.S.A.: A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Analysis of International Monetary and Trade Policies," NBER Chapters, in: Issues in US-EC Trade Relations, pages 371-390, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Franck Amalric & Henri Sterdyniak, 1989. "Interdépendance et coopération : les leçons d'une maquette," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 26(1), pages 135-156.
    6. Carrera, Jorge Eduardo, 1995. "Efectos precio y comercio en un area monetaria asimetrica [Price and trade effects in an asymmetric monetary area]," MPRA Paper 7844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5262 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Daniel Cohen & Jacques Mélitz & Gérard Oudiz, 1988. "Le système monétaire européen et l'asymétrie franc-mark," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(3), pages 667-678.
    9. Peter Mooslechner & Martin Schuerz, 1999. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: Any Lessons for EMU? A Selective Survey of the Literature," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 171-199, September.
    10. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Macroeconomic policy effects in a monetary union," Working Papers 1993-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    11. Scheide, Joachim & Sinn, Stefan, 1987. "Internationale Koordination der Wirtschaftspolitik: Pro und Contra," Kiel Discussion Papers 135, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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