European Policy Coordination: An Evaluation
Uncoordinated macroeconomic policies lead to 'beggar thy neighbour' strategies which are clearly suboptimal for the European Community as a whole. Given the high degree of interdependence of their economies, European governments have a clear incentive to export their inflation or their unemployment. No formal model is needed to conclude that among countries which have similar economic structures, policy objectives and policy instruments such competition is bound to be futile and costly for all concerned. In this paper we try to shed light on these aspects of European policy coordination, both through the use of a simple analytic model and through an empirical evaluation of the potential gains of superior European strategies.
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|Date of creation:||Oct 1985|
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