One Remark on Spillover Effects and the Gains from Coordination
There is a firmly rooted presumption among economists that the greater the interdependence, the larger the externalities generated by unilateral policy-making and therefore the greater the potential gains from coordination. The author demonstrates that despite its intuitively obvious connection with the gains from coordination, interdependence is not in itself sufficient to ensure that advantages will stem from a cooperative process. Indeed, it is shown that, even if interdependence is certainly necessary for coordination gains, the actual source of such gains is comparative policy advantage. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 43 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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