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Interlocking directorates as a trust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry

  • Carbonai Davide
  • Di Bartolomeo Giovanni

This paper investigates the market structure of the insurance business by analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created by their directors. We focus on the non-life business since this is a sector relatively closed with respect to the competition with other financial activities; an absence of industry competition cannot thus be compensated by other agents. We apply the graph theory to describe the network and the principal component analysis to summarize information and verify the correlation between direct interlocking and companies’ market shares.

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File URL: http://wp.comunite.it/data/wp_no_1_2006.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Communication, University of Teramo in its series wp.comunite with number 0001.

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Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://wp.comunite.it/

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  1. Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 2532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Enrico Marchetti & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2003. "Central Banks and Information Provided to the Private Sector," Macroeconomics 0311009, EconWPA.
  3. Watts, Alison, 2001. "A Dynamic Model of Network Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 331-341, February.
  4. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
  5. Berglof, Erik & Perotti, Enrico, 1994. "The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 259-284, October.
  6. Eccles, Robert G., 1981. "The quasifirm in the construction industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 335-357, December.
  7. Yannis M. Ioannides & Linda Datcher Loury, 2004. "Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1056-1093, December.
  8. Giuseppe Turchetti & Cinzia Daraio, 2004. "How Deregulation Shapes Market Structure and Industry Efficiency: The Case of the Italian Motor Insurance Industry," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, vol. 29(2), pages 202-218, 04.
  9. Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno, 2000. "Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?," IZA Discussion Papers 105, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Samir Kamat & Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2004. "Networks and Farsighted Stability," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 561, Econometric Society.
  11. Dooley, Peter C, 1969. "The Interlocking Directorate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 314-23, June.
  12. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 7-26.
  13. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226531083 is not listed on IDEAS
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