Endogenous interlocking directorates
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More about this item
Keywords
Oligopoly; Firm Organization and Market Structure; Executives;JEL classification:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2018-05-07 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2018-05-07 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2018-05-07 (Marketing)
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