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The Italian Chamber of Lords Sits on Listed Company Boards: An Empirical Analysis of Italian Listed Company Boards from 1998 to 2006

Author

Listed:
  • Santella, Paolo
  • Drago, Carlo
  • Polo, Andrea

Abstract

The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to the literature on country interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships in the Italian listed companies from 1998 to 2006. We find that over the entire period a high percentage of the Italian listed companies are connected with each other through a very small minority of directors. Such group of interlocking (overwhelmingly male) directors shows a remarkable stability over time with very few entrants and very few exits mainly related to the passing away of the director. We define them for brevity the Lords of the Italian stockmarket. Lords tend to belong to families of directors, with the first five families having more than 100 directorships in nine years. The highest level of connectivity concerns those companies that belong to the MIB 30/S&P-MIB 40 index, the Italian Blue Chips. In particular, practically all the financial Blue Chips are connected with each other through a web of directors continuously from 1998 to 2006. The extent, depth, and stability of the connections among the Italian listed companies, and in particular the main Italian financial companies, raise doubts on the extent of their competitive behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Santella, Paolo & Drago, Carlo & Polo, Andrea, 2007. "The Italian Chamber of Lords Sits on Listed Company Boards: An Empirical Analysis of Italian Listed Company Boards from 1998 to 2006," MPRA Paper 2265, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2265
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gualdani, Cristina, 2018. "An Econometric Model of Network Formation with an Application to Board Interlocks between Firms," TSE Working Papers 17-898, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2019.
    2. Drago, Carlo & Millo, Francesco & Ricciuti, Roberto & Santella, Paolo, 2015. "Corporate governance reforms, interlocking directorship and company performance in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 38-49.
    3. Carlo Drago & Roberto Ricciuti & Paolo Santella, 2015. "An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform," Working Papers 2015.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Marco Caiffa & Vincenzo Farina & Lucrezia Fattobene, 2021. "CEO Duality: Newspapers and Stock Market Reactions," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, January.
    5. Lucia Bellenzier & Rosanna Grassi, 2014. "Interlocking directorates in Italy: persistent links in network dynamics," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 9(2), pages 183-202, October.
    6. Ottorino Morresi & Alessia Naccarato, 2016. "Are Family Firms Different in Choosing and Adjusting Their Capital Structure? An Empirical Analysis through the Lens of Agency Theory," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(7), pages 216-216, July.
    7. Maria Rosa Battaggion & Vittoria Cerasi, 2018. "Endogenous interlocking directorates," Working Papers 380, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 01 May 2018.
    8. Marco Caiffa & Vincenzo Farina & Lucrezia Fattobene, 2020. "All that glitters is not gold: CEOs' celebrity beyond media content," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 444-460, July.
    9. Ettore Croci & Rosanna Grassi, 2014. "The economic effect of interlocking directorates in Italy: new evidence using centrality measures," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 89-112, March.
    10. Carlos Drago & Francesco Millo & Roberto Ricciuti & Paolo Santella, 2011. "Corporate Governance Reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company Value in Italy (1998-2007)," CESifo Working Paper Series 3322, CESifo.
    11. Carlo Drago & Roberto Ricciuti, 2019. "Bootstrapping the Gini Index of the Network Degree: An Application for Italian Corporate Governance," Working Papers 05/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    12. Carlo Drago & Livia Amidani Aliberti & Davide Carbonai, 2014. "Measuring Gender Differences in Information Sharing Using Network Analysis: the Case of the Austrian Interlocking Directorship Network in 2009," Working Papers 2014.61, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    13. Lucrezia Fattobene & Marco Caiffa & Emiliano Di Carlo, 2018. "Interlocking directorship across Italian listed companies: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(2), pages 393-425, June.
    14. Carlo Drago & Francesco Millo & Roberto Ricciuti & Paolo Satella, 2011. "The Role of Women in the Italian Network of Boards of Directors, 2003-2010," Working Papers 10/2011, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    15. Maria Rosaria Carillo & Vincenzo Lombardo & Alberto Zazzaro, 2013. "Family Firm Connections and Entrepreneurial Human Capital in the Process of Development," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 89, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; interlocking directorships; board turnover; antitrust; competition; social network analysis (SNA); exploratory data analysis (EDA); empirical corporate finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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