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An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform

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  • Drago, Carlo
  • Ricciuti, Roberto
  • Santella, Paolo

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects on the Italian directorship network of the corporate governance reform that was introduced in Italy in 2011 to prevent interlocking directorships in the financial sector. Interlocking directorships are important communication channels among companies and may have anticompetitive effect. We apply community detection techniques to the analysis of the networks in 2009 and 2012 to ascertain the effect of the reform. We find that, although the number of interlocking directorships decreases in 2012, the reduction takes place mainly at the periphery of the network whereas the network core is stable, allowing the most connected companies to keep their strategic position.

Suggested Citation

  • Drago, Carlo & Ricciuti, Roberto & Santella, Paolo, 2016. "An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform," Economy and Society 230584, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemso:230584
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.230584
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    File URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/230584/files/NDL2015-082.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Santella, Paolo & Drago, Carlo & Polo, Andrea, 2007. "The Italian Chamber of Lords Sits on Listed Company Boards: An Empirical Analysis of Italian Listed Company Boards from 1998 to 2006," MPRA Paper 2265, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lucrezia Fattobene & Marco Caiffa & Emiliano Di Carlo, 2018. "Interlocking directorship across Italian listed companies: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(2), pages 393-425, June.
    2. An Zeng & Stefano Battiston, 2016. "The Multiplex Network of EU Lobby Organizations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(10), pages 1-15, October.
    3. Drago, Carlo, 2015. "Exploring the Community Structure of Complex Networks," MPRA Paper 81024, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Drago, Carlo, 2015. "Exploring the Community Structure of Complex Networks," MPRA Paper 81024, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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