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An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform

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  • Carlo Drago

    (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

  • Roberto Ricciuti

    (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

  • Paolo Santella

    (ESMA)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects on the Italian directorship network of the corporate governance reform that was introduced in Italy in 2011 to prevent interlocking directorships in the financial sector. Interlocking directorships are important communication channels among companies and may have anticompetitive effect. We apply community detection techniques to the analysis of the networks in 2009 and 2012 to ascertain the effect of the reform. We find that, although the number of interlocking directorships decreases in 2012, the reduction takes place mainly at the periphery of the network whereas the network core is stable, allowing the most connected companies to keep their strategic position.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlo Drago & Roberto Ricciuti & Paolo Santella, 2015. "An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform," Working Papers 11/2015, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:11/2015
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    Cited by:

    1. Lucrezia Fattobene & Marco Caiffa & Emiliano Di Carlo, 2018. "Interlocking directorship across Italian listed companies: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(2), pages 393-425, June.
    2. Drago, Carlo, 2015. "Exploring the Community Structure of Complex Networks," MPRA Paper 81024, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. An Zeng & Stefano Battiston, 2016. "The Multiplex Network of EU Lobby Organizations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(10), pages 1-15, October.
    4. Roy Cerqueti & Giulia Rotundo, 2023. "The weighted cross-shareholding complex network: a copula approach to concentration and control in financial markets," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 18(2), pages 213-232, April.
    5. Drago, Carlo, 2015. "Exploring the Community Structure of Complex Networks," MPRA Paper 81024, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    interlocking directorships; corporate governance; community detection; social networks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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