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Ceo Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations


  • Alain Alcouffe

    () (LIRHE - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de recherche sur les Ressources Humaines et l'Emploi - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Hee-Young Yeo
  • Christine Pochet


In France the chairperson of the board is mostoften the firm's CEO. This position strengthensthe insiders' hold on the board of directors.Moreover, a large fraction of outside directorsis composed of CEOs of other firms. Thereciprocal interlocking of CEOs creates the possibility of mutual interdependence of CEOs.We investigate factors explaining reciprocalinterlocking directorates of CEOs in Frenchcorporations. Our results indicate that CEOs oflarger firms hold more reciprocal CEOinterlocks and when CEOs have more outsidedirectorships, CEOs hold more reciprocalrelationships. We also find a positiverelationship between the number of CEOsreciprocal interlocks and their firms'performance measured by ROA. We find evidencethat CEOs hold more reciprocal interlocks whena blockholder is present on the CEO's board. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003
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  • Alain Alcouffe & Hee-Young Yeo & Christine Pochet, 2003. "Ceo Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations," Post-Print halshs-00006093, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00006093
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 842-852, September.
    2. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    3. Dooley, Peter C, 1969. "The Interlocking Directorate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 314-323, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alain Capiez, 2006. "Réseaux d'entreprises et performance : une approche empirique," Post-Print halshs-00548094, HAL.
    2. Drago, Carlo & Millo, Francesco & Ricciuti, Roberto & Santella, Paolo, 2015. "Corporate governance reforms, interlocking directorship and company performance in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 38-49.
    3. Juan Antonio Rubio Mondéjar & Josean Garrués Irurzun, 2012. "Estructura corporativa e interlocking directorates en las mayores empresas españolas, 1917-1970," FEG Working Paper Series 01/12, Faculty of Economics and Business (University of Granada).
    4. Kai Jäger, 2013. "Sources of Franco-German corporate support for the euro: The effects of business network centrality and political connections," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(1), pages 115-139, March.
    5. Kai Jäger, 2017. "Studies on Issues in Political Economy since the Global Financial Crisis," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 71.
    6. Patricia Crifo & Antoine Rebérioux, 2016. "Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility: a typology of OECD countries," Post-Print halshs-01591993, HAL.
    7. Lucia Bellenzier & Rosanna Grassi, 2014. "Interlocking directorates in Italy: persistent links in network dynamics," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 9(2), pages 183-202, October.
    8. Mohamed Khenissi & Peter Wirtz, 2013. "Processus Decisionnel En Matiere De Remuneration Des Dirigeants : Le Cas Vinci," Working Papers halshs-00850083, HAL.
    9. Ansari, Iram Fatima & Goergen, Marc & Mira, Svetlana, 2018. "How Reported Board Independence Overstates Actual Board Independence in Family Firms: A Methodological Concern," Annals of Corporate Governance, now publishers, vol. 3(2), pages 81-183, March.
    10. Aïssaoui, Rachida & Fabian, Frances, 2015. "The French Paradox: Implications for Variations in Global Convergence," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 31-48.
    11. Szymon Kaczmarek & Satomi Kimino & Annie Pye, 2014. "Interlocking directorships and firm performance in highly regulated sectors: the moderating impact of board diversity," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(2), pages 347-372, May.
    12. Évelyne Rouby, 2008. "Le lien composition/rôles du conseil d’administration:une analyse en termes de capital social," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie,, vol. 11(2), pages 29-50, June.
    13. Carlos Drago & Francesco Millo & Roberto Ricciuti & Paolo Santella, 2011. "Corporate Governance Reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company Value in Italy (1998-2007)," CESifo Working Paper Series 3322, CESifo.
    14. Andrew J. Ward & Daniel C. Feldman, 2008. "Survival of the Embedded: Expelling and Embedding Forces on Members of the Corporate Elite," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 239-251, May.
    15. Gérard Charreaux, 2003. "Le point sur... les réseaux d'administrateurs et de dirigeants," Working Papers CREGO 1030801, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    16. Tristan Auvray & Olivier Brossard, 2016. "French connections: interlocking directorates and ownership network in an insider governance system," Post-Print hal-01372455, HAL.
    17. Ali Dardour, 2009. "L'Influence Sur La Remuneration Des Dirigeants Des Liens Humains Entre Les Administrateurs Des Societes Cotees : Une Analyse Du Reseau Des Societes Cotees Au Sbf 250," Post-Print halshs-00459365, HAL.

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