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Monetary policy uncertainty and unionized labour markets

  • Bernd Hayo
  • Hans Peter Gruner
  • Carsten Hefeker

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File URL: http://repec.org/mmfc03/Hayo.pdf
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Paper provided by Money Macro and Finance Research Group in its series Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 with number 42.

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Date of creation: 27 Sep 2004
Handle: RePEc:mmf:mmfc03:42
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.essex.ac.uk/afm/mmf/index.html

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  1. Gerlach, Stefan & Smets, Frank, 1995. "The Term Structure of Euro-Rates: Some Evidence in Support of the Expectations Hypothesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 1258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Jensen, Henrik, 2002. " Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(3), pages 399-422, September.
  3. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
  4. Gruner, Hans Peter, 2002. "How much should central banks talk?: A new argument," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 195-198, October.
  5. repec:iza:izadps:dp534 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2001. "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England.
  7. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June.
  8. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Bollerslev, Tim, 1986. "Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 307-327, April.
  10. S[empty]rensen, Jan Rose, 1991. "Political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 377-381, December.
  11. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  12. Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P, 1994. " Institutions and (Short-Run) Macroeconomic Performance," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 35-56, March.
  13. Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage-Setters," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 374, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  14. Alex Cukierman & Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Labor Markets and Monetary Union; a Strategic Analysis," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 365, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  15. Skott, Peter, 1997. "Stagflationary Consequences of Prudent Monetary Policy in a Unionized Economy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 609-622, October.
  16. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  17. Carsten Hefeker & Helge Berger & Ronnie Schlöb, 2002. "Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and Monopoly Trade Unions," IMF Working Papers 02/44, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Osterwald-Lenum, Michael, 1992. "A Note with Quantiles of the Asymptotic Distribution of the Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Rank Test Statistics," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 54(3), pages 461-472, August.
  19. Calmfors, Lars, 1998. "Macroeconomic Policy, Wage Setting and Employment - What Difference Does the EMU Make?," Seminar Papers 657, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  20. Hansen, Bruce E., 1992. "Testing for parameter instability in linear models," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 517-533, August.
  21. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2002. "How Much Should Central Banks Talk? A New Argument," CEPR Discussion Papers 3194, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Donald W.K. Andrews, 1988. "Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 877R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 1989.
  23. Johansen, Soren, 1992. "Cointegration in partial systems and the efficiency of single-equation analysis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 389-402, June.
  24. Johansen, Soren, 1988. "Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 12(2-3), pages 231-254.
  25. Gruner, Hans Peter & Hefeker, Carsten, 1999. " How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(1), pages 33-47, March.
  26. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-538, June.
  27. Pierluigi Balduzzi & Giuseppe Bertola & Silverio Foresi, 1993. "A Model of Target Changes and the Term Structure of Interest Rates," NBER Working Papers 4347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
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