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The Role of Uncertain Government Preferences For Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction

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Listed:
  • Olga S. Kuznetsova

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Sergey A. Merzlyakov

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper explores the role of uncertain government preferences for fiscal and monetary policy interaction. Our analysis shows that the uncertainty about government preferences does not affect the macroeconomic equilibrium if the fiscal multiplier is known. In the case of multiplicative uncertainty, uncertain government preferences make fiscal policy more contractionary, while monetary policy becomes more expansionary. This leads to higher expected inflation and lower expected output, which means a stronger inflation bias

Suggested Citation

  • Olga S. Kuznetsova & Sergey A. Merzlyakov, 2015. "The Role of Uncertain Government Preferences For Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction," HSE Working papers WP BRP 102/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:102/ec/2015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal and monetary policy interaction; multiplicative uncertainty; uncertain preferences.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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