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Strategic Interaction Between Fiscal and Monetary Policies in an Export-Oriented Economy


  • Sergey Merzlyakov

    () (Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)


Solving the problem of stabilizing the economy is directly tied to the necessity of keeping the main macroeconomic variables stable. However, macroeconomic stability is not in the general case a purely fiscal or a purely monetary problem. How the central bank and the government interact is of principle importance. We investigate the impact of macroeconomic policies on the dynamics of the exchange rate, inflation, output and stabilization fund and consider different forms of strategic interaction between the government and the central bank. In this paper we build a stylized model of an export-oriented economy. We use numerical examples for our analysis and practical conclusions. The effective interaction of fiscal and monetary policies is possible under a cooperative Stackelberg game interaction with the government as leader. It is shown that the independence of the central bank does not play a crucial role.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergey Merzlyakov, 2012. "Strategic Interaction Between Fiscal and Monetary Policies in an Export-Oriented Economy," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 59(2), pages 201-216, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:voj:journl:v:59:y:2012:i:2:p:201-216

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    Fiscal policy; Monetary policy; Exchange rate;

    JEL classification:

    • E41 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Demand for Money
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy


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