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Regime switches under policy uncertainty in monetary unions

Listed author(s):
  • Canofari Paolo
  • Di Bartolomeo Giovanni

This paper analyzes the effects of policy uncertainty on the stability of a monetary union. Focusing on peripheral countries, we study how uncertainty over the consequences of a possible exit affects regime switches. Applying game theory and a cost-benefit analysis, we model a regime switch as the endogenous result of a two-stage policy game. We find that the effects of uncertainty are not trivial. Unilateral exits are less probable, but contagion is more likely to be observed. Our results are driven by two opposite forces: a traditional conservative effect induced by policy uncertainty in a single policymaker framework, which calls for more stability, and a strategic effect arising from the strategic interaction, which may undermine the monetary union’s foundation and strengthen incentives for contagion.

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File URL: http://wp.comunite.it/data/wp_no_126_2016.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Communication, University of Teramo in its series wp.comunite with number 00126.

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Date of creation: Nov 2016
Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:00126
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://wp.comunite.it/

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  1. Giannoni, Marc P., 2002. "Does Model Uncertainty Justify Caution? Robust Optimal Monetary Policy In A Forward-Looking Model," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(01), pages 111-144, February.
  2. Katsimi, Margarita & Moutos, Thomas, 2010. "EMU and the Greek crisis: The political-economy perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 568-576, December.
  3. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126, December.
  4. De Grauwe, Paul, 2012. "In Search of Symmetry in the Eurozone," CEPS Papers 6901, Centre for European Policy Studies.
  5. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Francesco Giuli & Marco Manzo, 2009. "Policy uncertainty, symbiosis, and the optimal fiscal and monetary conservativeness," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 461-474, November.
  6. Haile, Fasika & Pozo, Susan, 2008. "Currency crisis contagion and the identification of transmission channels," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 572-588, October.
  7. Schuknecht, Ludger & von Hagen, Jürgen & Wolswijk, Guido, 2010. "Government bond risk premiums in the EU revisited: the impact of the financial crisis," Working Paper Series 1152, European Central Bank.
  8. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233439, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  9. P. De Grauwe & Marc-Alexandre Sénégas, 2006. "Monetary policy design and transmission asymmetry in EMU: does uncertainty matter?," Post-Print hal-00150390, HAL.
  10. Paolo Canofari & Giovanni Bartolomeo & Giovanni Piersanti, 2014. "Theory and Practice of Contagion in Monetary Unions: Domino Effects in EMU Mediterranean Countries," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 20(3), pages 259-267, August.
  11. Paolo Canofari & Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2014. "Measuring Currency Pressure and Contagion Risks in Countries under Monetary Unions: The Case of Euro," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(4), pages 455-469, December.
  12. Canofari Paolo & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Piersanti Giovanni, 2014. "Strategic interactions and contagion effects under monetary unions," wp.comunite 0110, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  13. Paul de Grauwe & Yuemei Ji, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: an empirical test," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 49648, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  14. Klomp, Jeroen & de Haan, Jakob, 2009. "Political institutions and economic volatility," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 311-326, September.
  15. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Kristin J. Forbes, 2001. "Are Trade Linkages Important Determinants of Country Vulnerability to Crises?," NBER Working Papers 8194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Giuli Francesco, 2009. "Fiscal and monetary interaction under monetary policy uncertainty," wp.comunite 0061, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  18. Wolfram Berger & Helmut Wagner, 2005. "Interdependent Expectations and the Spread of Currency Crises," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(1), pages 41-54, April.
  19. Pietro Alessandrini & Michele Fratianni & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Andrea Presbitero, 2014. "External Imbalances and Fiscal Fragility in the Euro Area," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 3-34, February.
  20. Masson, Paul, 1999. "Contagion:: macroeconomic models with multiple equilibria," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 587-602, August.
  21. Stephen G. Cecchetti, 1998. "Policy rules and targets: framing the central banker's problem," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jun, pages 1-14.
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