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Stabilizing Output and Inflation: Policy Conflicts and Co‐operation under a Stability Pact


  • Marco Buti
  • Werner Roeger
  • Jan In't Veld


The article analyses in a simple setting a game between an inflation‐conservative central bank and a fiscal authority subject to an upper limit on the budget deficit. It is shown that complementarity or substitutability between the policies and the preference of each authority for the other authority's behaviour crucially depends on the type of shock hitting the economy. If the government attempts to stimulate output beyond its natural level, a ‘deficit bias’ emerges under non‐co‐operation; under co‐operation, the equilibrium is characterized by both a ‘deficit bias’ and an ‘inflation bias’. However, if the government only pursues cyclical stabilization these biases disappear and there are positive gains from co‐ordinating the policy responses to shocks.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Buti & Werner Roeger & Jan In't Veld, 2001. "Stabilizing Output and Inflation: Policy Conflicts and Co‐operation under a Stability Pact," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 801-828, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:39:y:2001:i:5:p:801-828
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00332

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