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A model of exchange rate crises with partisan governments

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  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon

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  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2001. "A model of exchange rate crises with partisan governments," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8394, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/8394
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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Edwards, Sebastian, 1996. "Exchange Rates and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Discipline," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 159-163, May.
    5. Ellis, Christopher J & Thoma, Mark A, 1991. "Partisan Effects in Economies with Variable Electoral Terms," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(4), pages 728-741, November.
    6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April.
    7. Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 325-345.
    8. Ellis, Christopher J. & Thoma, Mark A., 1996. "The implications for an open economy of partisan political business cycles: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 635-651, April.
    9. Klein, Michael W. & Marion, Nancy P., 1997. "Explaining the duration of exchange-rate pegs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 387-404, December.
    10. Bachman, Daniel, 1992. "The effect of political risk on the forward exchange bias: the case of elections," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 208-219, April.
    11. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
    12. Alexius, Annika, 1999. "Inflation rules with consistent escape clauses," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 509-523, March.
    13. Blomberg, S. Brock & Hess, Gregory D., 1997. "Politics and exchange rate forecasts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 189-205, August.
    14. Ozkan, F. Gulcin & Sutherland, Alan, 1998. "A currency crisis model with an optimising policymaker," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 339-364, April.
    15. Lobo, Bento J. & Tufte, David, 1998. "Exchange Rate Volatility: Does Politics Matter?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 351-365, April.
    16. Robert P. Flood & Peter Isard, 1989. "Monetary Policy Strategies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 612-632, September.
    17. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. M. R. Garfinkel & A. Glazer & J. Lee, 1999. "Election Surprises and Exchange Rate Uncertainty," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 255-274, November.
    19. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    20. Gartner, Manfred, 1986. "Some political economy of flexible exchange rates," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 153-168.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cermeño, Rodolfo & Grier, Robin & Grier, Kevin, 2010. "Elections, exchange rates and reform in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 166-174, July.
    2. Dreher, Axel & Walter, Stefanie, 2010. "Does the IMF Help or Hurt? The Effect of IMF Programs on the Likelihood and Outcome of Currency Crises," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.

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