Why Have Some Monetary Reforms Succeeded and Others Not? - An Empirical Assessment
Monetary history is characterised by crisis and reform. The paper is dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful. A cross--sectional exonometric analysis is schosen to deal wht this problem. It is based on a standard macroeconomic model of commitment and credibility. As the dependent variable, we calculate a post-reform inflation rate. the exogenous variables are the degree of legal commitment and the constraining influence of institutions. The paper allows for the conclusion that monetray commitment, the consideration of institutional constraints and abstinence from the money press are crucial for the success of a monetary reform.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2001|
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- repec:imf:imfpdp:9418 is not listed on IDEAS
- Robert J. Barro, 1982.
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- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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