Why Have Some Monetary Reforms Succeeded and Others Not? - An Empirical Assessment
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References listed on IDEAS
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert J. Barro, 1983. "Inflationary Finance under Discretion and Rules," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-16, February.
- Bruno, M., 1991. "High Inflation and the Nominal Anchors of an Open Economy," Princeton Studies in International Economics 183, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
- Adam G. G. Bennett, 1993. "The Operation of the Estonian Currency Board," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(2), pages 451-470, June.
More about this item
KeywordsMonetary Reforms; Credibility; Commitment; Institutions;
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
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