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Ling Zhu

Personal Details

First Name:Ling
Middle Name:
Last Name:Zhu
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pzh522
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/umdlingzhu/
Terminal Degree:2015 Department of Economics; University of Maryland (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Maryland

College Park, Maryland (United States)
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/
RePEc:edi:deumdus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Guillermo Vuletin & Ling Zhu, 2011. "Replacing a "Disobedient" Central Bank Governor with a "Docile" One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(6), pages 1185-1215, September.

Citations

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Articles

  1. Guillermo Vuletin & Ling Zhu, 2011. "Replacing a "Disobedient" Central Bank Governor with a "Docile" One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(6), pages 1185-1215, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Jakob de Haan & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2016. "The politics of central bank independence," Working Papers 539, DNB.
    3. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 2016-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2020. "More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 87-105.
    5. Ansgar Belke & Andreas Freytag & Johannes Keil & Friedrich Schneider, 2012. "The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements - Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s," Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series 2012-34, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    6. Qureshi, Irfan, 2017. "Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1139, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    7. Berggren, Niclas & Daunfeldt, Sven-Olof & Hellström, Jörgen, 2012. "Social Trust and Central-Bank Independence," Working Paper Series 920, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    8. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    9. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    10. Ha,Jongrim & Ivanova,Anna & Ohnsorge,Franziska Lieselotte & Unsal Portillo Ocando,Derya Filiz, 2019. "Inflation : Concepts, Evolution, and Correlates," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8738, The World Bank.
    11. Nolivos, Roberto Delhy & Vuletin, Guillermo, 2014. "The role of central bank independence on optimal taxation and seigniorage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 440-458.
    12. Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant, 2021. "Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    13. Strong, Christine Olivia, 2021. "Political influence, central bank independence and inflation in Africa: A comparative analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).

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