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Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence

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  • Qureshi, Irfan

Abstract

Why does low central bank independence generate high macroeconomic instability? A government may periodically appoint a subservient central bank chairman to exploit the inflation-output trade-off, which may generate instability. In a New Keynesian framework, time-varying monetary policy is connected with a “chairman effect.” To identify departures from full independence, I classify chairmen based on tenure (premature exits), and the type of successor (whether the replacement is a government ally). Bayesian estimation using cross-country data confirms the relationship between policy shifts and central bank independence, explaining approximately 25 (15) percent of inflation volatility in developing (advanced) economies. Theoretical analyses reveal a novel propagation mechanism of the policy shock.

Suggested Citation

  • Qureshi, Irfan, 2017. "Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence," Economic Research Papers 269096, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269096
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269096
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    Keywords

    Financial Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
    • O57 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries

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