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Financial Crises and the Dismissal of Central Bank Governors: New Evidence

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  • I. Kadek Dian Sutrisna Artha
  • Jakob Haan

Abstract

This paper examines whether financial crises affect the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. Employing a conditional fixed effects logit model for 101 countries during the period 1970–2007, we find that financial crises significantly increase the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover. When we decompose crises into banking, currency, and debt crises we find that banking crises and debt crises significantly increase the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. Our results also suggest that financial crises increase the probability that a non‐government ally will be appointed as new central bank governor. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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  • I. Kadek Dian Sutrisna Artha & Jakob Haan, 2015. "Financial Crises and the Dismissal of Central Bank Governors: New Evidence," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 80-95, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:ijfiec:v:20:y:2015:i:1:p:80-95
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    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    2. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 2016-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. repec:eee:poleco:v:52:y:2018:i:c:p:120-140 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2018. "Central bankers as supervisors: Do crises matter?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 120-140.

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