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Simple Monetary Rules under Fiscal Dominance

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  • MICHAEL KUMHOF
  • RICARDO NUNES
  • IRINA YAKADINA

Abstract

This paper asks whether interest rate rules that respond aggressively to inflation, following the Taylor principle, are feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance. We find that if interest rates are allowed to also respond to government debt, they can produce unique equilibria. But such equilibria are associated with extremely volatile inflation. The resulting frequent violations of the zero lower bound make such rules infeasible. Even within the set of feasible rules the welfare optimizing response to inflation is highly negative. The welfare gain from responding to government debt is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance. Copyright (c) 2010 The Ohio State University No claim to original US government works.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Kumhof & Ricardo Nunes & Irina Yakadina, 2010. "Simple Monetary Rules under Fiscal Dominance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(1), pages 63-92, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:63-92
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Eiji Tsuzuki, 2016. "Fiscal policy lag and equilibrium determinacy in a continuous-time New Keynesian model," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(3), pages 215-232, September.
    2. Qureshi, Irfan, 2015. "Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence," MPRA Paper 81646, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2017.
    3. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 2016-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Ali, Syed Zahid & Anwar, Sajid, 2013. "Inflation and interest rates in the presence of a cost channel, wealth effect and agent heterogeneity," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 286-296.
    5. Pina, Gonçalo, 2015. "The recent growth of international reserves in developing economies: A monetary perspective," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 172-190.
    6. Shabbir, Safia, 2012. "Balance Sheet Channel of Monetary Policy and Economic Growth under Fiscal Dominance: Evidence from Pakistan," MPRA Paper 41496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Danciulescu, Cristina, 2014. "Macroeconomic equilibrium and welfare under simple monetary and switching fiscal policy rules," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 58-68.

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    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General

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