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(Optimal) Monetary Policy with and without Debt

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  • Boris Chafwehé
  • Rigas Oikonomou
  • Romanos Priftis
  • Lukas Vogel

Abstract

We propose a framework of optimal monetary policy where debt sustainability may, or may not, be a relevant constraint for the central bank. We show analytically that in each environment the optimal interest rate path consists of a Taylor rule augmented with forward guidance terms. These terms arise either i) from “twisting interest rates” when the central bank ensures debt sustainability, or ii) under no debt concerns, from committing to keep interest rates low at the exit of the liquidity trap. The optimal policy is isomorphic to Leeper’s (1991) “passive monetary/active fiscal policy” regime in the first instance, or “active monetary/passive fiscal policy” regime in the second. We insert our framework into a standard medium scale DSGE model calibrated to the US. Optimal passive monetary policy with debt concerns is ineffective in stabilizing inflation, whereas under no debt concerns, monetary policy is very effective in stabilizing the macroeconomy.

Suggested Citation

  • Boris Chafwehé & Rigas Oikonomou & Romanos Priftis & Lukas Vogel, 2021. "(Optimal) Monetary Policy with and without Debt," Staff Working Papers 21-5, Bank of Canada.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:21-5
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic models; Fiscal policy; Monetary policy; Monetary policy framework;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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