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Central Bank Independence, Financial Instability and Politics: New Evidence for OECD and Non-OECD Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Pistoresi B.
  • Cavicchioli M.
  • Brevini G.

Abstract

This paper investigates the nonlinear relationship between energy consumption and GDP in Taiwan. By applying the method of Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2006), we consider the possibility of significant threshold effects within the long-run relationship between the two variables, where the effect is trigged by changes in the phase of the business cycle. The Granger-causality test in a threshold model indicates the relationship between energy consumption and GDP is regime-dependent. A bidirectional relationship between these two variables is observed in the contractionary regime, implying that energy serves as an engine of economic growth and that reductions in energy use will have adverse effects on economic activities. On the other hand, a unidirectional causality running from GDP to energy consumption is detected in the expansionary regime. It indicates energy conservation is feasible in this regime with little or no detrimental effects on economic growth. The policy implications are that energy use and economic growth are jointly reinforcing each other during recessionary periods. However, in periods of high economic growth when energy consumption cannot bring about economic growth, energy conservation policies should be adopted with more aggressive thinking.

Suggested Citation

  • Pistoresi B. & Cavicchioli M. & Brevini G., 2017. "Central Bank Independence, Financial Instability and Politics: New Evidence for OECD and Non-OECD Countries," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(7), pages 179-188, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:9:y:2017:i:7:p:179-188
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cukierman, Alex, 2008. "Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions -- Past, present and future," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 722-736, December.
    2. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2014. "Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(1), pages 189-259, March.
    3. B. Pistoresi & F. Salsano & D. Ferrari, 2011. "Political institutions and central bank independence revisited," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(7), pages 679-682.
    4. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, March.
    5. Marcello D'Amato & Barbara Pistoresi & Francesco Salsano, 2009. "On the determinants of Central Bank independence in open economies," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 107-119.
    6. David Romer, 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(4), pages 869-903.
    7. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May.
    8. Farvaque, Etienne, 2002. "Political determinants of central bank independence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 131-135, September.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    10. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    11. Arnone, Marco & Romelli, Davide, 2013. "Dynamic central bank independence indices and inflation rate: A new empirical exploration," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 385-398.
    12. de Jong, Eelke, 2002. "Why are price stability and statutory independence of central banks negatively correlated? The role of culture," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 675-694, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank independence; economic; political and institutional determinants; multicollinearity; factor model; linear regression;

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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