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A jegybanki függetlenség és elszámoltathatóság a válság előtt és után
[Independence and accountability of central banks before and after the global financial crisis]

Author

Listed:
  • Bihari, Péter

Abstract

A válságot megelőzően a jegybankok működési kereteit meghatározó formális szabályok biztosították a monetáris politikai célok eléréséhez szükséges magas fokú jegybanki autonómiát. A tényleges függetlenség azonban a döntéshozók kinevezése és felmentése során érvényesülő politikai szempontok következtében már ekkor sem érvényesült teljes egészében. A válság hatására felértékelődött a makroprudenciális politika, ami új feladatokat jelent a jegybankok számára. A jegybanki függetlenség válság előtti értelmezése a megváltozott makrogazdasági körülmények és a kibővült jegybanki tevékenység fényében felülvizsgálatra szorul. Az árstabilitás továbbra is csak a jegybanki eszközök politikai befolyástól mentes használata mellett teremthető meg. A makroprudenciális tevékenység azonban csak a kormányzattal együttműködésben végezhető, ami megnehezíti a klasszikus monetáris politika autonómiájának fenntartását. De facto várhatóan tovább szűkül a jegybank függetlensége a kamatpolitika területén is, aminek negatív társadalmi következményei majd akkor válnak láthatóvá, amikor az árstabilitás érdekében szigorítani kell a monetáris politikán, ám a rövid távú politikusi érdekektől esetleg eltérő döntések meghozatalához nem lesz a jegybanknak ereje. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: H11, G18, E42, E52, E58, G18, H68.

Suggested Citation

  • Bihari, Péter, 2017. "A jegybanki függetlenség és elszámoltathatóság a válság előtt és után
    [Independence and accountability of central banks before and after the global financial crisis]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 573-593.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1701
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2017.6.573
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H68 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt

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