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Report NEP-CDM-2005-10-15
This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Marco Novarese issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-CDM
The following items were announced in this report:
- César Martinelli, 2005, "Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics, number 784828000000000461, Oct.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005, "Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics, number 784828000000000465, Oct.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005, "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa, number we055726, Oct.
- Item repec:eab:govern:638 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Silje Aslaksen & Ragnar Torvik, 2005, "A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, number 5805, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005, "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-376, Sep.