IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality

  • Giulio Federico
Registered author(s):

    Donors who try to impose policy conditionality on countries receiving their aid commonly face conflicting incentives between using aid to induce income-increasing reforms and using aid to assist low-income countries: this conflict can lead to a time-consistency problem. This paper offers a contractual analysis of conditionality, showing how conditionality contracts are affected by conflicting donor incentives in the presence of limited commitment power. Conditionality is shown to survive in an environment with weak donor commitment power, and it can eliminate the inefficiency associated with the no-conditionality outcome. However, even when conditionality is successfully imposed by donors, there may be an inverse relationship between aid and reform across different aid recipients. Multi-recipient and hidden-information extensions of the baseline model are also considered.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2001-16text.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford in its series CSAE Working Paper Series with number 2001-16.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2001-16
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
    Phone: +44-(0)1865 271084
    Fax: +44-(0)1865 281447
    Web page: http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2001-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Payne)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.