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Putty-clay politics in transition economies

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  • Lyons, Robert F.
  • Rausser, Gordon C.
  • Simon, Leo K.

Abstract

We build a bargaining-theoretic model of an important dilemma inherent in any major political economic transition process. While swiftly removing the old order is a necessary condition for a successful transition, it also leads to widespread social disruption that may threaten the viability of the reform process. This issue lies at the heart of much of the "big-bang/gradualism" debate in the literature. We argue that this dichotomy is overly simplistic. In particular, the debate, as it has been framed, has failed to capture the significance of interest group competition. Interest group competition matters precisely because the political environment during a transition is fluid and malleable and is thus open to manipulation by interests seeking to mold post-transition governance structures to best serve themselves. As different economic and political structures will give rise to different incentives within these interest groups, one might expect that transition strategies will differ across societies. We show this is the case with two interesting examples. First, we consider how transition strategies differ in open and closed economies. We are able to derive a number of strong results, the most striking of which identifies conditions under which closed economies outperform open economies in terms of social welfare. Our second set of experiments examines Krueger's (1993) "vicious and virtuous circles" theory of policy reform. We identify conditions under which societies with political systems that reward rent-seeking behavior enjoy higher social welfare than societies with political systems that reward productive behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Lyons, Robert F. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 1996. "Putty-clay politics in transition economies," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0t30p88v, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt0t30p88v
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gerard, 1995. "The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1207-1223, December.
    3. Woo Wing Thye, 1994. "The Art of Reforming Centrally Planned Economies: Comparing China, Poland, and Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 276-308, June.
    4. Gerard Roland, 1994. "The role of political constraints in transition strategies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 2(1), pages 27-41, March.
    5. Vicente Galbis, 1994. "Sequencing of Financial Sector Reforms; A Review," IMF Working Papers 94/101, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Krueger, Anne O, 1993. "Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 351-355, May.
    7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    8. Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, L., 1992. "The Political Economy of Alliances: Structure and Performance," Staff General Research Papers Archive 712, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    9. Lyons, R. F. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, L. K., 1992. "Disruption and Continuity in Bulgaria's Agrarian Reform," Staff General Research Papers Archive 728, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Zusman, Pinhas, 1976. "The Incorporation and Measurement of Social Power in Economic Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(2), pages 447-462, June.
    11. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1992. "The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 889-906.
    12. Newbery, David M., 1993. "Transformation in mature versus emerging economies: Why has Hungary been less successful than China?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 89-116.
    13. Sachs, J.D. & Woo, W.T., 1994. "Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," Papers 94-01, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
    14. Baron, David P & Ferejohn, John, 1987. "Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 303-309, May.
    15. Rausser, Gordon C & Freebairn, John W, 1974. "Estimation of Policy Preference Functions: An Application to U.S. Beef Import Quotas," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(4), pages 437-449, November.
    16. Gordon C. Rausser & Leo K. Simon, 1992. "Political Economy of Alliances: Structure and Performance, The," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 92-gatt10, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    17. Paul G. Hare, 1991. "Hungary: In Transition to a Market Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 195-201, Fall.
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