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Disruption and Continuity in Bulgaria's Agrarian Reform

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  • Lyons, R. F.
  • Rausser, Gordon C.
  • Simon, L. K.

Abstract

The Bulgarian land reform process is burdened by a fundamental tension between disruption and continuity. This tension arises from the dual roles played by the nomenklatura in the transition to a market economy. Both roles stem from their privileged status in the old order. While the nomenklatura have the potential to provide the agricultural sector with indispensable human capital, they also have the' potential to extract rents from the sector, thus undermining its competitiveness. Both the productivity of nomenklatura capital and their capacity to extract rents are diminished to the extent that the reform disrupts the established agrarian order. Thus in order to succeed, the agrarian reform process must sail between Scylla and Charybdis. Too much disruption degrades economic productivity, possibly to the extent of threatening the viability of the reform movement itself. Too much continuity skews the distribution of political power in favor of the nomenklatura, which may undermine the competitiveness of the nascent free market institutions. This chapter develops a formal political-economic model of this trade-off. The model challenges the conventional political economic wisdom that decoupling politics from economics will improve economic performance. In particular, we identify conditions under which the quality of the transition is enhanced by coupling the nomenklatura's acquisition of political power to the magnitude of the rents that they extract.
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Suggested Citation

  • Lyons, R. F. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, L. K., 1992. "Disruption and Continuity in Bulgaria's Agrarian Reform," Staff General Research Papers Archive 728, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Gordon C. Rausser & Pinhas Zusman, 1992. "Public Policy and Constitutional Prescription," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(2), pages 247-257.
    3. Zusman, Pinhas, 1976. "The Incorporation and Measurement of Social Power in Economic Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(2), pages 447-462, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lyons, Robert & Rausser, Gordon & Simon, Leo, 1996. "Putty-Clay Politics in Transition Economies," CUDARE Working Papers 198638, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    2. Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K. & van 't Veld, Klaas T., 1994. "Political-economic processes and collective decision making," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt2s43m3nc, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    3. Thiele, H., 1998. "Die unterschätze Dimension der Vermögensauseinandersetzung in der Dekollektivierung des ostdeutschen Agrarsektors: eine Probit-Analyse der Gesetzesverstöße," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 34.

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