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Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining

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  • Krishna, V.
  • serrano, R.

Abstract

We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the "n"-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," [rho]. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (1) small values of [rho]; and (2) large values of [rho]. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of [rho] is provided.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Krishna, V. & serrano, R., 1993. "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining," Papers 10-93-31, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:10-93-31
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    Cited by:

    1. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2022. "The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    2. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2023. "An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 88-104.
    3. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2000. "Bargaining with asymmetric threat points," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 333-339, December.
    4. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021. "An experiment on the Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism," ISER Discussion Paper 1152, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    5. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value," Working Papers wp2007_0709, CEMFI.
    6. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2022. "Cost of complexity in implementing the Shapley value by choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure," ISER Discussion Paper 1176, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    7. Marco Rogna, 2022. "The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 735-768, October.
    8. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2023. "An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 589-609, June.
    9. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
    10. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    11. Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.
    12. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2022. "An experiment on the Nash program: Comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value," ISER Discussion Paper 1175, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    13. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    14. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Min-Hung Tsay & Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2020. "A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1045-1057, December.
    15. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
    16. Ju, Yuan, 2012. "Reject and renegotiate: The Shapley value in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 431-436.
    17. Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 19-40, January.
    18. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021. "An Experiment on the Nash Program: Comparing two Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value," GREDEG Working Papers 2021-07, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.

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