Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
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References listed on IDEAS
- Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2009.
"The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints,"
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- Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2008. "The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 6741, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2008. "The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1209, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
- Brookins, Philip & Lightle, John P. & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2015.
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- Philip Brookins & John Lightle & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2014. "Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities," Working Papers wp2014_09_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg & Iryna Topolyan, 2014. "The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 603-640, November.
- Cardona, Daniel & Rubí-Barceló, Antoni, 2016. "Group-contests with endogenous claims," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 97-111.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 959-971, December.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2015. "The Group All-Pay Auction with Heterogeneous Impact Functions," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 069, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- repec:eee:matsoc:v:95:y:2018:i:c:p:47-53 is not listed on IDEAS
- Christian Ewerhart, 2016. "A "fractal" solution to the chopstick auction," ECON - Working Papers 229, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2017.
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