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Revenue Sharing, Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Runkel

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract

This paper investigates revenue sharing in an asymmetric two team contest model of a sports league with Nash behavior of team owners. The innovation of the analysis is that it focuses on the role of the contest success function (CSF). In case of an inelastic talent supply, revenue sharing turns out to worsen competitive balance regardless of the shape of the CSF. For the case of an elastic talent supply, in contrast, the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends on the specification of the CSF. We fully characterize the class of CSFs for which revenue sharing leaves unaltered competitive balance and identify CSFs ensuring that revenue sharing renders the contest closer.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Runkel, 2008. "Revenue Sharing, Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function," FEMM Working Papers 08012, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:08012
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    Cited by:

    1. Ratul Lahkar & Saptarshi Mukherjee, 2022. "Optimal Large Population Tullock Contests," Working Papers 82, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    2. Aloys L. Prinz, 2019. "Indirect Evolution and Aggregate-Taking Behavior in a Football League: Utility Maximization, Profit Maximization, and Success," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-12, May.
    3. Misael Martinez & Jonathan Willner, 2017. "Competitive Balance and Consumer Demand in the English Football League," Applied Finance and Accounting, Redfame publishing, vol. 3(2), pages 49-60, August.
    4. Aloys Prinz & Stefan Thiem, 2021. "Value‐maximizing football clubs," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 68(5), pages 605-622, November.
    5. Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Schwartz, 2013. "Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 589-630, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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