Revenue Sharing, Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function
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- Marco Runkel, 2011. "Revenue Sharing, Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(3), pages 256-273, August.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gu, Yiquan & Wenzel, Tobias, 2009.
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- E. Woodrow Eckard, 2006. "Comment: "Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game: The Walrasian Fixed-Supply Conjecture Model, Contest-Nash Equilibrium, and the Invariance Principle"," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 7(2), pages 234-239, May.
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- Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Schwartz, 2013. "Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 589-630, March.
More about this item
KeywordsRevenue Sharing; Competitive Balance; Contest Success Function;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-IPR-2008-04-21 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2008-04-21 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SPO-2008-04-21 (Sports & Economics)
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