Workshops or Barracks? Productive versus Enforcive Investment and Economic Performance
For many countries in the world today and for much of history, investment in ordinary productive capital has been overshadowed by investment in enforcive capital: castles and siege machines; tanks, missiles and army barracks. We introduce a dynamic model which allows for investment in the latter form of capital, in which competing groups contest output through their holdings of enforcive capital. We show how investment in productive capital declines in relation to enforcive investment as the number of competing groups increases, and how this leads to a decline in steady-state output and welfare.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:97-98-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.