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Democratization, personal wealth of politicians and voting behavior

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  • Machielsen, Bas

Abstract

Between about 1850 and 1920, Western Europe underwent a period of democratization and liberalization, resulting in the expansion of government and the establishment of universal suffrage. This paper examines the impact of politicians’ personal wealth on this process, with a focus on the case of The Netherlands, using data from newly-collected probate inventories as a measure of politicians’ wealth. The paper finds that the wealth of parliaments decreased significantly over time, and that richer politicians were more likely to vote against fiscal legislation, suggesting that personal wealth negatively influenced the probability of increasing taxes and played a role in determining government size. The analyses presented in the paper support a causal interpretation of these results. However, the study finds no significant relationship between politicians’ personal wealth and their voting behavior on suffrage extensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Machielsen, Bas, 2026. "Democratization, personal wealth of politicians and voting behavior," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:99:y:2026:i:c:s0014498325000804
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2025.101733
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    JEL classification:

    • N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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