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The Political Economy of the Prussian Three-class Franchise

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  • Becker, Sascha O.
  • Hornung, Erik

Abstract

Did the Prussian three-class franchise, which politically over-represented the economic elite, affect policy-making? Combining MP-level political orientation, derived from all roll call votes in the Prussian parliament (1867–1903), with constituency characteristics, we analyze how local vote inequality, determined by tax payments, affected policy-making during Prussia's period of rapid industrialization. Contrary to the predominant view that the franchise system produced a conservative parliament, higher vote inequality is associated with more liberal voting, especially in regions with large-scale industry. We argue that industrialists preferred self-serving liberal policies and were able to coordinate on suitable MPs when vote inequality was high.

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  • Becker, Sascha O. & Hornung, Erik, 2019. "The Political Economy of the Prussian Three-class Franchise," CEPR Discussion Papers 13930, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13930
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inequality; Political economy; Three-class franchise; Elites; Prussia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N93 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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