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What Motivates an Oligarchic Elite to Democratize? Evidence from the Roll Call Vote on the Great Reform Act of 1832

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  • Aidt, Toke S.
  • Franck, Raphaël

Abstract

The Great Reform Act of 1832 was a watershed for democracy in Great Britain. We study the vote on 22 March 1831 in the House of Commons to test three competing theories of democratization: public opinion, political expedience, and threat of revolution. Peaceful agitation and mass-support for reform played an important role. Political expedience also motivated some members of Parliament to support the reform, especially if they were elected in constituencies located in counties that would gain seats. Violent unrest in urban but not in rural areas had some influence on the members of Parliament. Counterfactual scenarios suggest that the reform bill would not have obtained a majority in the House of Commons in the absence of these factors.

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  • Aidt, Toke S. & Franck, Raphaël, 2019. "What Motivates an Oligarchic Elite to Democratize? Evidence from the Roll Call Vote on the Great Reform Act of 1832," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 773-825, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:79:y:2019:i:03:p:773-825_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Marino, Maria & Donni, Paolo Li & Bavetta, Sebastiano & Cellini, Marco, 2020. "The democratization process: An empirical appraisal of the role of political protest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. Toke Aidt & Felix Grey & Alexandru Savu, 2021. "The Meaningful Votes: Voting on Brexit in the British House of Commons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 587-617, March.
    3. Andrea Marcucci & Dominic Rohner & Alessandro Saia, 2023. "Ballot or Bullet: The Impact of the UK’s Representation of the People Act on Peace and Prosperity," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(652), pages 1510-1536.
    4. Kainuma, Shuhei, 2024. "Transition to broader-based politics: The role of suffrage extension in early 20th century Japan," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    5. Krieger, Tommy, 2020. "Elite structure and the provision of health-promoting public goods," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Ammons, Joshua D., 2024. "Institutional effects of nonviolent and violent revolutions," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).
    7. Veselov, Dmitry & Yarkin, Alexander, 2024. "Lobbying for Industrialization: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 17045, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Baten, Jörg & Keywood, Thomas & Wamser, Georg, 2021. "Territorial state capacity and elite violence from the 6th to the 19th century," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    9. Aidt, T. S & Grey, F. & Savu, A., 2019. "The Three Meaningful Votes: Voting on Brexit in the British House of Commons," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1979, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    10. Tommy Krieger, 2024. "Elites and health infrastructure improvements in industrializing regimes," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 433-468, September.
    11. Li Donni, Paolo & Marino, Maria & Welzel, Christian, 2021. "How important is culture to understand political protest?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    12. Tommy Krieger, 2022. "Elites and Health Infrastructure Improvements in Industrializing Regimes," CESifo Working Paper Series 9808, CESifo.

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