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Private Returns to Public Office

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  • Raymond Fisman

    ()

  • Florian Schulz

    ()

  • Vikrant Vig

    ()

Abstract

The wealth accumulation of Indian parliamentarians using public disclosures required of all candidates since 2003 are studied. Annual asset growth of winners is on average 3 to 6 percentage points higher than runners-up. By performing a within-constituency com- parison where both runner-up and winner run in consecutive elections, and by looking at the subsample of very close elections, a range of alternative explanations for differential earnings of politicians and a relevant control group are ruled out. The “winner's premium" comes from parliamentarians holding positions in the Council of Ministers, with asset re- turns 13 to 29 percentage points higher than non-winners. The benefit of winning is also concentrated among incumbents, because of low asset growth for incumbent non-winners. [BREAD Working paper]. URL:[http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/working/344.pdf].

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Fisman & Florian Schulz & Vikrant Vig, 2012. "Private Returns to Public Office," Working Papers id:4979, eSocialSciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:4979
    Note: Institutional Papers
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Private Returns; Public Office; Information disclosure; Indian politics; Regression discontinuity; Annual asset growth; Indian parliamentarians; asset growth; candidates; salary earnings; politicians' motivations;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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