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Private Returns to Public Office

  • Raymond Fisman

    ()

  • Florian Schulz

    ()

  • Vikrant Vig

    ()

The wealth accumulation of Indian parliamentarians using public disclosures required of all candidates since 2003 are studied. Annual asset growth of winners is on average 3 to 6 percentage points higher than runners-up. By performing a within-constituency com- parison where both runner-up and winner run in consecutive elections, and by looking at the subsample of very close elections, a range of alternative explanations for differential earnings of politicians and a relevant control group are ruled out. The “winner's premium" comes from parliamentarians holding positions in the Council of Ministers, with asset re- turns 13 to 29 percentage points higher than non-winners. The benefit of winning is also concentrated among incumbents, because of low asset growth for incumbent non-winners. [BREAD Working paper]. URL:[http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/working/344.pdf].

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Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:4979.

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Date of creation: May 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:4979
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  1. Guido Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, 2007. "Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice," NBER Working Papers 13039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  6. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
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  9. Eggers, Andy & Hainmueller, Jens, 2008. "MPs for Sale? Estimating Returns to Office in Post-War British Politics," MPRA Paper 7892, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
  11. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  12. Serguey Braguinsky & Sergey Mityakov & Andrey Liscovich, 2014. "Direct Estimation of Hidden Earnings: Evidence from Russian Administrative Data," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(2), pages 281 - 319.
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