Industry Income and Congressional Regulatory Legislation: Interest Groups vs. Median Voter
Interest group theories of regulation suggest that industries will be able to gain political benefits at the expense of the larger, but disorganized and disinterested, general public. However, casual observation indicates that industries are often the targets of costly legislation. The authors examine how the political influence and vulnerability of industries are affected by industry income. Results show wealthy industries are more likely to be subject to costly legislation, whereas no relationship was found between industry income and the granting of political benefits. They interpret these results as supportive of both interest group and median voter models of the political process. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 30 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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