Check Bouncing and Fiscal Irresponsibility: Evidence of Nonideological Shirking by Legislators
J. Kalt and M. Zupan have measured ideological shirking by legislators. Here the authors present evidence concerning nonideological shirking. They demonstrate that representatives with more overdrawn checks tend to be more fiscally irresponsible, with fiscal irresponsibility measured by National Taxpayer Union ratings and by representatives' voting behavior on the recent House balanced budget amendment vote. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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