The Ideological Component of Senate Voting: Different Principles or Different Principals?
Evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator-specific, ideologically-driven shirking of constituent interest occurs. In this paper, the authors use a well-known model of such shirking by senators as their point of departure and add measures of inter-state constituent interests, the role of campaign contributions and, hence, the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection. The authors find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators. Finally, accounting for inter-state constituent interests, shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection. Thus, it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically-driven shirking. Coauthors are William Hallagan, Cyril Morong, and Tesa Stegner. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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