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Attenuated Property Rights and the Market for Governors

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  • Crain, W Mark
  • Tollison, Robert D

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Suggested Citation

  • Crain, W Mark & Tollison, Robert D, 1977. "Attenuated Property Rights and the Market for Governors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 205-211, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:20:y:1977:i:1:p:205-11
    DOI: 10.1086/466898
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    Cited by:

    1. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    2. Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "Turn-taking in office," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 205-226, June.
    3. Gregory Randolph, 2011. "The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 265-286, September.
    4. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2004. "Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-Federal Jurisdictions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1294, CESifo.
    5. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    6. Klarin, Jonas, 2019. "Term Length and Public Finances: The Case of U.S. Governors," Working Paper Series 2019:5, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    7. John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December.
    8. Ernesto Dal Bó & Martín Rossi, 2008. "Term Length and Political Performance," NBER Working Papers 14511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Thomas Wyrick & Roger Arnold, 1989. "Earmarking as a deterrent to rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 283-291, March.
    10. Burton Abrams, 1981. "Political power and the market for governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 521-529, January.
    11. Yogesh Uppal, 2011. "Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 189-207, April.
    12. Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo & Andreas Wagener, 2017. "The Optimal Duration of Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 6808, CESifo.
    13. Joaquín Artés & Enrique Viñuela, 2007. "Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations: an empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 41-55, October.
    14. Roger D. Congleton, 2017. "Robert D. Tollison and the economics of politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 23-28, April.
    15. Per G. Fredriksson & Le Wang & Patrick L Warren, 2013. "Party Politics, Governors, and Economic Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(1), pages 106-126, July.
    16. Bryan P. Cutsinger & Alexander Marsella & Yang Zhou, 2022. "Insuring legislative wealth transfers: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 127-144, July.
    17. Monica P. Escaleras & Peter T. Calcagno, 2009. "Does the Gubernatorial Term Limit Type Affect State Government Expenditures?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(5), pages 572-595, September.
    18. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 769-798.
    19. Lott, John R, Jr, 2000. "A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-393, October.

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