Party Politics and the Price of Payola
The literature contains two competing views of the role of political parties: parties are treated either as assoc iations of interest groups supported to the degree that they offer el ectoral support in the lawmaker's district, or as expressions of the personal ideologies of the lawmakers. In this paper, parties are trea ted as bargaining agents for groups of lawmakers in their dealings wi th interest groups. Interest groups are depicted buying votes on prop osals where those votes are cheapest. Parties are combinations of con sistently low-price vote suppliers. The theory has empirical power th at discriminates between it and the two competing models. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 26 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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