IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v62y1989i2p119-138.html

Concealed takings: Capture and rent-seeking in the Indian Sugar Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Shyam Kamath

Abstract

This paper has attempted to test the applicability of the Public Choice approach in explaining regulation in the Indian Sugar Industry over the 1967–82 period. A test for discriminating between Public Interest and Capture theories of regulation was developed and implemented in the context of the historical pattern of controls found in the Indian Sugar Industry. The results point toward the rejection of the Public Interest theory of regulation and are consistent with the hypothesis of the capture of regulation by the regulated industry. The importance of the various interest groups and their influence on the regulation actually enacted was also revealed by the analysis. The findings are consistent with the existence of substantial rent-seeking and other D.U.P. activity (Bhagwati, 1982) in the Indian sugar sector during the post-independence period. They point toward the substantial welfare losses suffered by consumers and the economy at large as a result of the control regime that has existed in the Indian sugar sector. Removal of such controls will more than likely increase the availability of sugar at lower prices thus increasing the welfare of consumers while reducing the extent of corruption and other rent-seeking activity that the controls have generated. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • Shyam Kamath, 1989. "Concealed takings: Capture and rent-seeking in the Indian Sugar Industry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 119-138, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:2:p:119-138
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124329
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00124329
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00124329?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shyam Kamath, 1988. "Partially suppressed markets: Controls, rent seeking and the cost of protection in the indian sugar industry," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 124(1), pages 140-160, March.
    2. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
    3. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    4. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    5. Jagdish N. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, 1975. "Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: India," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bhag75-1, January-J.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nadia Fiorino & Roberto Ricciuti, 2009. "Interest Groups and Government Spending in Italy, 1876-1913," CESifo Working Paper Series 2722, CESifo.
    2. repec:elg:eechap:15325_11 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    4. Peter T. Leeson & M. Scott King & Tate J. Fegley, 2020. "Regulating quack medicine," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 273-286, March.
    5. James B. Bailey & Diana W. Thomas & Joseph R. Anderson, 2019. "Regressive effects of regulation on wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 91-103, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
    2. Kamath Shyam J., 1994. "Privatization: A Market Prospect Perspective," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 53-104, March.
    3. Magnus Söderberg, 2008. "Uncertainty and regulatory outcome in the Swedish electricity distribution sector," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 79-94, February.
    4. Simshauser, Paul, 2024. "On static vs. dynamic line ratings in renewable energy zones," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    5. Ojo, Marianne, 2006. "The Role of External Auditors and International Accounting Bodies in Financial Regulation and Supervision," MPRA Paper 354, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2006.
    6. Sophie Harnay, 2023. "Richard A. Posner: From Public Choice Theory to Economic Analysis of Law (1969-1973)," Working Papers AFED 23-02, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    7. Mountain, Bruce R., 2019. "Ownership, regulation, and financial disparity: The case of electricity distribution in Australia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-1.
    8. Schmidt, Dominik & Stöckl, Thomas & Palan, Stefan, 2024. "Voting for insider trading regulation. An experimental study of informed and uninformed traders’ preferences," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    9. Lehr, William & Sicker, Douglas, 2017. "Communications Act 2021," 28th European Regional ITS Conference, Passau 2017 169478, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    10. Ando, Amy, 1998. "Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-43-rev, Resources for the Future.
    11. Parker, David, 2001. "Economic Regulation: A Preliminary Literature Review and Summary of Research Questions Arising," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30616, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    12. William C. Mitchell, 1990. "Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 85-108, January.
    13. Yogesh Uppal, 2011. "Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 189-207, April.
    14. Phares, Jonathan & Dobrzykowski, David D. & Prohofsky, Jodi, 2021. "How policy is shaping the macro healthcare delivery supply chain: The emergence of a new tier of retail medical clinics," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 333-345.
    15. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon, 2016. "First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(4), pages 1645-1672.
    16. Oleh Pasko, 2018. "Theories of Regulation in the Context of Modern Practice of Accounting Regulation," Oblik i finansi, Institute of Accounting and Finance, issue 2, pages 37-46, June.
    17. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2007. "Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 199-229, October.
    18. Dallas Burtraw & William Shobe, 2008. "State and Local Climate Policy under a National Emissions Floor," Working Papers 2008-05, Center for Economic and Policy Studies.
    19. Zheying Wu & Robert Salomon, 2017. "Deconstructing the liability of foreignness: Regulatory enforcement actions against foreign banks," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 48(7), pages 837-861, September.
    20. Christopher Costello & Corbett A. Grainger, 2018. "Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 441-479.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:2:p:119-138. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.