Concealed takings: Capture and rent-seeking in the Indian Sugar Industry
This paper has attempted to test the applicability of the Public Choice approach in explaining regulation in the Indian Sugar Industry over the 1967–82 period. A test for discriminating between Public Interest and Capture theories of regulation was developed and implemented in the context of the historical pattern of controls found in the Indian Sugar Industry. The results point toward the rejection of the Public Interest theory of regulation and are consistent with the hypothesis of the capture of regulation by the regulated industry. The importance of the various interest groups and their influence on the regulation actually enacted was also revealed by the analysis. The findings are consistent with the existence of substantial rent-seeking and other D.U.P. activity (Bhagwati, 1982) in the Indian sugar sector during the post-independence period. They point toward the substantial welfare losses suffered by consumers and the economy at large as a result of the control regime that has existed in the Indian sugar sector. Removal of such controls will more than likely increase the availability of sugar at lower prices thus increasing the welfare of consumers while reducing the extent of corruption and other rent-seeking activity that the controls have generated. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
- Richard A. Posner, 1974.
"Theories of Economic Regulation,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:2:p:119-138. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.