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Politician Preferences,Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying

Author

Listed:
  • Ivan Pastine

    (Economics,UCD, Dublin 4.)

  • Tuvana Pastine

    (Economics Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland, Maynooth)

Abstract

The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. In contrast to the previous literature where the politician has no preference over policy alternatives, we find that a more restrictive binding cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support a barely binding cap over no cap on contributions. The cap always favors the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred irrespective of the identity of the high-valuation lobbyist. The introduction of politician policy preferences permits an analysis of welfare tradeoffs of contribution caps. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2008. "Politician Preferences,Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying," Economics Department Working Paper Series n1991208.pdf, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
    • Handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n1991208.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Political campaign spending limits," Working Papers 201034, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    2. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on Political Contributions, Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences," Working Papers 200912, School of Economics, University College Dublin.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    All-pay auction; campaign finance reform; explicit ceiling.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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