Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Competition and Incumbency Advantage
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- Eric Avis & Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan & Carlos Varjão, 2017. "Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Competition and Incumbency Advantage," NBER Working Papers 23508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2018.
"The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014,"
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- Julia Cage & Yasmine Bekkouche, 2018. "The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," Sciences Po publications 12614, Sciences Po.
- Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia, 2018. "The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," CEPR Discussion Papers 12614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pinar Yildirim & Andrei Simonov & Maria Petrova & Ricardo Perez-Truglia, 2020. "Are Political and Charitable Giving Substitutes? Evidence from the United States," NBER Working Papers 26616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2020.
"The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017,"
Sciences Po publications
2020-07, Sciences Po.
- Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2020. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," CEPR Discussion Papers 15150, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2020. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2020-07, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
- Song, B.K., 2020. "The effect of public financing on candidate reemergence and success in elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
- Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2019.
"The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014,"
Sciences Po publications
2019-09, Sciences Po.
- Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2019. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2019-09, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2017-06-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAM-2017-06-18 (Central & South America)
- NEP-POL-2017-06-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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