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An empirical test of why incumbents adopt campaign spending limits

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  • Thomas Evans

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  • Thomas Evans, 2007. "An empirical test of why incumbents adopt campaign spending limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 437-456, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:437-456
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9170-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas A. Evans, 2006. "The Effects of Discretionary Federal Spending on Parliamentary Election Results," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(2), pages 234-248, April.
    2. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
    3. K. Palda & Kristian Palda, 1985. "Ceilings on campaign spending: Hypothesis and partial test with Canadian data," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 313-331, January.
    4. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    5. Abramowitz, Alan I., 1988. "Explaining Senate Election Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 385-403, June.
    6. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
    7. Bender, Bruce, 1988. "An Analysis of Congressional Voting on Legislation Limiting Congressional Campaign Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(5), pages 1005-1021, October.
    8. Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-798, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Peichl & Nico Pestel & Sebastian Siegloch, 2013. "The politicians’ wage gap: insights from German members of parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 653-676, September.
    2. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Political campaign spending limits," Working Papers 201034, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    3. Kevin Milligan & Marie Rekkas, 2008. "Campaign spending limits, incumbent spending, and election outcomes," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(4), pages 1351-1374, November.
    4. Filippo Gregorini & Filippo Pavesi, 2011. "Do Campaign Finance Policies Really Improve Voters' Welfare?," Working Papers 209, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2011.

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    Keywords

    Campaign spending; Parliamentary elections;

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