The Effects of Discretionary Federal Spending on Parliamentary Election Results
Parliamentary rules make it difficult for opposition members of Parliament to influence government spending. As the electorate is aware of this situation discretionary federal spending is expected to affect vote-share differently for majority and opposition incumbents. Consistent estimators yield positive and significant point estimates for the impact of increases in spending for majority incumbents in Canadian federal elections yet yield negative but insignificant point estimates for opposition incumbents. Furthermore, $100 additional federal spending per capita in an electoral district is estimated to increase majority candidates' vote-share, regardless of incumbency, by between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points. (JEL D72, H59) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 44 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:44:y:2006:i:2:p:234-248. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.