IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Nachträgliche Reduktion von Vorstandsbezügen: Eine ökonomische Analyse der Herabsetzungsmöglichkeit von Vorstandsbezügen nach dem VorstAG

Author Info

  • Duran, Mihael

Abstract

In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird eine modelltheoretische Untersuchung der verschärften sogenannten Herabsetzungsmöglichkeit von Vorstandsbezügen nach dem VorstAG anhand der Turniertheorie vorgenommen. Hierzu wird ein Modell entwickelt, um mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen der Verminderung von Vorstandsbezügen zu untersuchen. Das Modell zeigt einige Implikationen zu den Entscheidungen von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/50542/1/668802510.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics in its series Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge with number 332.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:332
Contact details of provider: Postal: Keplerstr. 17, 72074 Tübingen
Phone: 07071/29-72563
Fax: 07071/29-5179
Web page: http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/en/faculties/wirtschafts-und-sozialwissenschaftliche-fakultaet/faecher/wirtschaftswissenschaft.htmlEmail:


More information through EDIRC

Keywords: executive compensation; tournaments;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
  • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Koch, Rosemarie & Raible, Karl-Friedrich & Stadtmann, Georg, 2011. "Vorstandsvergütung in Deutschland - ist eine Trendwende in Sicht?," Discussion Papers 299, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
  2. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
  3. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-64, June.
  4. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Michael L. Bognanno, 1988. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," NBER Working Papers 2638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1985. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 85-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  6. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
  7. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September.
  8. Eriksson, Tor, 1999. "Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 262-80, April.
  9. Hall, Brian J. & Murphy, Kevin J., 2002. "Stock options for undiversified executives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-42, February.
  10. Robert Gibbons, 1997. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 127-149, Winter.
  11. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Michael L. Bognanno, 1990. "The incentive effects of tournaments revisited: Evidence from the European PGA tour," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 74-88, February.
  12. Christopher Ferrall, 1996. "Promotions and Incentives in Partnerships: Evidence from Major U.S. Law Firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 811-27, November.
  13. Alannah Orrison & Andrew Schotter & Keith Weigelt, 2004. "Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental Examination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(2), pages 268-279, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

The CitEc project has not yet found citations to this item.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:332. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.