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Incumbency advantages in the Canadian Parliament

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  • Chad Kendall
  • Marie Rekkas

Abstract

We apply a regression discontinuity approach to determine incumbency advantages in the Canadian Parliament, finding that incumbents enjoy a 9.4-11.2% increased probability of winning over non-incumbents. Owing to the presence of multiple parties, an incumbency advantage in terms of vote share does not always translate to an increased probability of winning, because incumbents do not necessarily obtain votes from their closest opponent. Also, under the assumption that strategic exit is not an issue, we are able to split the incumbency advantage into party incumbency and individual candidate incumbency components, finding that the advantage is almost entirely due to the individual.

Suggested Citation

  • Chad Kendall & Marie Rekkas, 2012. "Incumbency advantages in the Canadian Parliament," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1560-1585, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:45:y:2012:i:4:p:1560-1585
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2012.01739.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Santosh Anagol & Thomas Fujiwara, 2016. "The Runner-Up Effect," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 927-991.
    2. J. Stephen Ferris & Stanley L. Winer & Derek Olmstead, 2018. "A Dynamic Model of Political Party Equilibrium: The Evolution of ENP in Canada, 1870–2015," Carleton Economic Papers 18-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 31 Jul 2019.
    3. Margherita Fort & Andrea Ichino & Enrico Rettore & Giulio Zanella, 2022. "Multicutoff RD designs with observations located at each cutoff: problems and solutions," FBK-IRVAPP Working Papers 2022-01, Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (IRVAPP), Bruno Kessler Foundation.
    4. Galasso, Vincenzo & Dano, Kevin & Ferlenga, Francesco & LePennec, Caroline & Pons, Vincent, 2022. "Coordination and Incumbency Advantage in Multi-Party Systems - Evidence from French Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 17600, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. J. Stephen Ferris & Derek E. H. Olmstead, 2012. "Fixed versus Flexible Election Cycles: Explaining innovation in the timing of Canada’s Election Cycle," Carleton Economic Papers 12-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Dec 2016.
    6. Andreea-Daniela Fedor & Corneliu Iațu, 2024. "No Space for Female Mayors in Romania: Incumbents’ Degree of Re-Election and the Impact on Future Candidates," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-17, May.
    7. Brandon Schaufele, 2013. "Dissent in Parliament as Reputation Building," Working Papers 1301E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    8. Marko Klašnja, 2016. "Increasing rents and incumbency disadvantage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(2), pages 225-265, April.
    9. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences," MPRA Paper 68650, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Nov 2015.
    10. J. Stephen Ferris & Derek E. H. Olmstead, 2017. "Fixed versus flexible election terms: explaining innovation in the timing of Canada’s election cycle," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 117-141, June.
    11. Anna Katharina Spälti & Mark J. Brandt & Marcel Zeelenberg, 2017. "Memory retrieval processes help explain the incumbency advantage," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 12(2), pages 173-182, March.
    12. Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2017. "The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection," Working papers 63, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    13. Michael P. Cameron & Patrick Barrett & Bob Stewardson, 2013. "Can Social Media Predict Election Results? Evidence from New Zealand," Working Papers in Economics 13/08, University of Waikato.
    14. Leandro de Magalhaes & Salomo Hirvonen, 2019. "The Incumbent-Challenger Advantage and the Winner-Runner-up Advantage," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 19/710, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    15. Nzabonimpa, Mélyne, 2023. "Gender differences in politician persistence and incumbency advantage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    16. Carlos Di Bonifacio & Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2024. "Incumbency Effect in Competitive Autocracies: evidence from Venezuela," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2402, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).

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