A Political Winner's Curse: Why Preventive Policies Pass Parliament so Narrowly
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More about this item
KeywordsPolitical economy; asymmetric information;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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