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Political Ideology and Economic Freedom

This paper examines the association between political ideology and the size of government and quality of the legal system and regulations. A cross-country indicator of government and citizen ideology is presented. Empirical results suggest that ideologically leftwing governments increase the size of government while the long-term ideological convictions of citizens affect the size of government and the quality of the legal system and regulations. These effects depend on the degree of political competition while ideology also affects countries’ institutional response to economic crisis.

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File URL: http://www.hha.dk/nat/wper/05-8_chbj.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 05-8.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:aareco:2005_008
Contact details of provider: Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/departments/nat.aspx

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