Demand of direct democracy
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.08.004
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Geschwind, Stephan & Roesel, Felix, 2022.
"Taxation under direct democracy,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 536-554.
- Stephan Geschwind & Felix Roesel, 2021. "Taxation under Direct Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 9166, CESifo.
- Celico, Andrea & Rode, Martin & Rodriguez-Carreño, Ignacio, 2024. "Will the real populists please stand up? A machine learning index of party populism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
- Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe, 2024. "Implementing direct democracy via representation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 85-92.
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More about this item
Keywords
Direct democracy; Representative democracy; Populism; Information; Elections;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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